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Mr Rector, honourable members of the board of the foundation 
for Strategic Studies and members of the board of trustees of this 
chair, dear audience, 
 
Recently a book has been published in which the author draws 
attention to one of the most underrated strategic thinkers 
of the eighteenth century, Jane Austen.1 Yes indeed, the Jane 
Austen of Pride and Prejudice, Sense and Sensibility and 
Persuasion. Since this claim brings together two of my main 
passions, English literature and strategy the book immediately 
caught my attention. Before you think, where is this going, 
stories about repressed emotions sprung from the over-active 
imagination of an old spinster, nothing is further from the 
truth. Prof. Chwe argues in his book that the mapping of the 
social dynamics in the novels of Jane Austen touches on the 
essence of strategy. The book Pride and Prejudice, for example, 
follows the adventures of the five unmarried daughters of Mr. 
Bennet; how can we marry them off well, without much of a 
dowry to offer? When the second daughter Elizabeth Bennet, 
in an interview with Lady Catherine de Bourgh, is pressed to 
forfeit on a marriage with Mr. Darcy, who is socially beyond 
her station and whom she had rejected before because of 
his alleged pride, she refuses to make that promise. Hereby 
Elizabeth indirectly signals to Darcy that his renewed attempts 
would be welcome. 
Chwe identifies fifty such cases of strategic manipulation 
in the social relations in the work of Austen. He specifically 
points to the importance of what he calls “cluelessness”. The 
various parties display very different degrees of strategic 
thinking, caused either by a lack of capacity, but also a lack of 
recognition that strategic thinking is actually necessary, the 
cluelessness. Lady de Bourgh had probably not contemplated 
that Elizabeth, her subordinate in the social hierarchy, could 
even consider manipulating her to deliver a strategic message 
to Darcy. In her indignation at the impertinent behaviour of 
Elizabeth, Lady de Bourgh functions as an unwitting mediator 
and becomes in fact a subordinate of Elizabeth. 
This is in short the issue I would like to address today, the lack 
of strategic thinking based on what I consider some degree of 
cluelessness, but even more so, an alarming degree of strategic 
illiteracy, among political, military and scholarly thinkers. At 
this point I do not want to incriminate myself any further 
in what has been called literary Darwinism, the search for 
the Origin of Species by sifting through older texts.2 I think it 
was Goethe who has previously claimed that all the brilliant 
thoughts have been thought before, the art is to think them 
again; indeed this afternoon we will attempt to rethink the 
essence of strategy. 
 
My aim is to develop my argument by first addressing what 
strategy is, make clear based on four basic rules, how it 
operates and subsequently provide both an explanation and a 
solution for why strategic thinking is so difficult.
Strategy is about the exercise of power.3 How do you ensure 
that you opponent does what you want him or her to do 
and, which he or she is not inclined to do initially? Strategy 
is about the use of available resources to ensure that your 
opponent changes course. A smart strategy will attempt to 
achieve the goal with limited, ingenious or surprising uses of 
resources, and not necessarily the most powerful tools, such as 
the military. As Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu wrote over two 
thousand years ago, the ultimate art of war is to subdue your 
opponent without the use of force.4 
How does strategic thinking work? In thinking about the 
use of resources to achieve a goal, a host of factors must be 
taken into account that will make it difficult to plan ahead. 
Strategic thinking always has something speculative. How 
will an opponent react to your actions and what reactions 
will you formulate yourself?5 Strategy aims to increase the 
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price of continued resistance, until the price of that resistance 
no longer weighs up against yielding to the desires of the 
opponent. It is unlikely that the rationality that you have in 
mind in planning your actions plays out in practice, when 
decisions have to be taken under time pressure. Not only 
does a thinking and calculating opponent play a role, but also 
the context of available resources and technology, the time 
horizon, the geographical conditions, history, culture, morality, 
ethical considerations, emotions and intuition need to be 
incorporated. 
Strategy can be sub-divided into the so-called levels of 
strategy.6 The first level is the tactical level involving manpower 
and equipment that come into contact with each other. The 
second level is the operational level where the military plans 
of the opponents meet. At this level, the link between the 
objective and the military plan that is supposed to bring 
the aim closer is practically elaborated.7 The highest level of 
strategy involves the merging of the political objective and the 
military plan. Strategy is not the same as policy, it is the link 
between the goals and the use of resources, the civil-military 
interface.8 All levels interact and are mutually dependent. 
States but also non-state actors, such as rebel movements and 
terrorist groups, can develop strategy and put it into effect. 
The levels of strategy can be compared with language, the 
tactical level, the words are the building blocks of a sentence, 
the operational level is the syntax or sentence structure, words 
must be in a specific order to be understandable. For example, 
there should ideally be a capital letter and a full stop at the end 
of a sentence The strategic level is the grammar, every good 
sentence has a subject, a verb and preferably also a direct and 
an indirect object. But only with the addition of logic, the 
target at the strategic level, has the sentence meaning. It can 
be understood and can fit within a larger text. Will it become 
a novel, a song or a poem? All parts are necessary and are 
mutually dependent, and so it is with strategy. Without words 
there will be no sentence, without a sentence there will be no 
logic and there is little logic without words. 
What is the problem then with strategy? The issue is that we are 
suffering from collective strategic illiteracy, we have forgotten 
how to think strategically. There is a problem with the directives 
of the political leadership to the military planners, which are 
suboptimal. How can, for example the very broad ambition of 
creating a democratic state be translated into a viable military 
plan, what is the grammar if you will? Soldiers have failed 
to explain the possibilities and limitations of the use of the 
military instrument to attain specific ends, there is a problem 
with the logic. The relationship between the objectives to be 
achieved and the resources available is completely off balance. 
Too large, unclear or unrealistic objectives, in combination 
with limited or inappropriate resources, makes conducting a 
thorough strategy a far-fetched goal.9 
Two examples can illustrate the problem; in 2010 General 
Stanley McChrystal was recalled from Afghanistan because he 
asked, among others, in an interview with a journalist from the 
magazine Rolling Stone, for a strategy that was lacking. What 
was the policy goal that should be achieved in Afghanistan? 
Originally in 2001 it was focused on the destruction of Al 
Qaeda, which was held responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Then 
it shifted to the expulsion of the Taliban that supported 
Al Qaeda, subsequently the goal was reinforcing the 
democratically elected government of Hamid Karzai and re-
building the Afghan state, which had never existed in the form 
it was now proposed. What military plan could be developed 
to connect all this? Which centre of gravity could be identified 
to tie all this together? Not only the political ambition but 
also the scope of the military deployment need to be viewed 
critically here. 
In 1952 during the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur 
was also called back, in this case because he had independently 
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advocated a change in strategy, which was importantly the 
domain of political decision-makers.10 An attack on China 
was not within the range of options which the politicians 
in Washington had in mind. During the Cold War, without 
wanting to glorify this period of the so-called long peace, there 
was a clear strategy that Western states shared: curbing the 
influence of the Soviet Union through deterrence, containment 
and preventing escalation of conflicts in the Third World. 
Among others in the shape of the Truman doctrine, there was 
a strategy that was thought out and that was the subject of 
debate and refinement. 
We have forgotten how to formulate viable political objectives, 
which can serve as a basis for making realistic military plans. 
Especially in the last twenty years strategic illiteracy has 
increased. We have been searching for our position and an 
appropriate strategic vision. The optimistic new world order 
of President Bush the elder, peace operations, the Global War 
on Terror, counter-insurgency and now the Long War, none 
of these ideas has enjoyed a great deal of enthusiasm, has been 
well thought out or subject of continued and widespread, 
public and scientific debate. We have tended to switch from 
one idea to another. It seems that our recent opponents, such 
as the former Al Qaeda network and the Taliban, Saddam 
Hussein and the Iraqi militias have been much more apt 
in thinking through a strategy, they at least have enjoyed 
superiority in their strategic message and involving the 
population in war. 
It is true that current threats do not always offer the challenge 
to think strategically, we seem to be stuck to some degree on 
the aforementioned cluelessness. Perhaps a geostrategic rise of 
China or the prospect of a cyber-war might change this. Power 
transitions and economic crises such as we are experiencing 
presently have been previously linked to the outbreak of large-
scale war. Thinking about cyber war is still in its infancy, and a 
comparison with the early years of the Cold War, when various 
strategic concepts were developed, seems appropriate.11 At the 
moment however, we seem to focus on tactical operations, 
such as disrupting hostile organization and taking out enemy 
leaders, rather than concentrating on the weaknesses of our 
opponents and implementing a deliberate and well considered 
strategy. 
I am neither the first nor the only one who identifies strategic 
illiteracy as a problem. Bernard Brodie, one of the founders of 
the field of strategic studies, did so already in 1949.12 He made 
his assessment on the eve of what is now known as the golden 
age of strategic studies.13 
Those who know me and my work will not be surprised that 
in my elaboration of the problem, I will use four central ideas 
about strategy, which can be traced to the much admired 
Prussian strategic thinker, and founder of the scientific study 
of war, Carl von Clausewitz. Maybe some of you were already 
wondering why it took me so long to get to this point. I will 
not disappoint you. Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier and an 
eyewitness to the Napoleonic wars. He had great respect for 
Napoleon’s military successes, which formed an important 
source of inspiration for his magnum opus Vom Kriege, which 
was unfinished and published posthumously in 1832.14 
The four central ideas that I would like to discuss are the 
following: firstly, before you can design a good strategy, you 
must understand the war you are fighting. Secondly, war is 
a continuation of politics by other means and thus strategy 
is a translation of the political objectives into military plans. 
Third, war is a versatile phenomenon, Clausewitz himself 
speaks about a chameleon, which means, among other things, 
that the motives for war can change over the course of time. 
Finally, Clausewitz warns that results in war are rarely final. I 
will argue that strategic thinking is largely an art rather than 
a science and that it is the approach to strategy, as expressed 
through rules and laws, which often gets in the way of clear 
strategic thinking. 
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Understand the war you are fighting 
How can we understand war? The essence of war is violence 
and a political objective linked in a means-ends relationship. 
Conflict trends show that the dominant form of war since the 
nineteenth century is civil war, an armed conflict fought in the 
context of a domestic political problem.15 A large part of the 
study to war, however, has focused on international wars. This 
paradox characterises the field to the present day and can be 
explained by the pressing nature of the threat of international 
war rather than practice.
War is a duel on a larger scale in which the political aims shape 
the passions of the population and the chance of the use of 
the military instrument. Before you can apply force you need 
to have a clear picture of what drives your opponent, what 
his motives are and his centre of gravity. The centre of gravity 
is the one particular object or element, which will deliver 
the opponent’s will when you have captured it. Often the 
centre of gravity is formed by his army, his capital, his main 
ally, his leader, the support of the population or a specific 
territory. The centre of gravity can also be the opponent’s 
cohesion, motivation, will or information position. You need 
to understand what drives the opponent and then draw your 
own plan. 
The etymological origin of the word strategy comes from 
ancient Greece where strategos meant general. What a general 
did on the battlefield in ancient Greece was the conduct of war, 
but his activities were closer to what we now call tactics rather 
than strategy. The idea of strategy surfaces at the end of the 
eighteenth century and the formation of standing professional 
armies.16 The Napoleonic wars proved the usefulness of a 
distinction between what happened on and off the battlefield. 
Wars were usually settled on the battlefield with the physical 
presence of the political commander in the form of the knight 
or the king who on site had to admit defeat or claim victory. 
The policy and strategy to be followed were personified in one 
individual. However, the size of the battlefield and the levee en 
masse in the Napoleonic Wars made distinguishing strategy a 
necessity.
The Enlightenment played an important role in the slow 
recognition to think through war. Maurice de Saxe wrote in 
1732 in his Reveries de l’Art de la Guerre that all sciences have 
their own principles and rules and that war up till then had 
nothing. Can we do what Copernicus did for astronomy and 
Newton for physics and apply the scientific method to the 
study of war?17 One of the writers who accepted this challenge 
to understand the essence of war was Heinrich von Bulow in 
his Geist des neueren Krieg Systems from 1799. He concluded 
in his book that there were geometric and mathematical 
principles to be discerned. Michael Howard called the book 
which was filled with mathematical formulas more than 
two centuries later ‘rococo absurdity’.18 A complete opposite 
conclusion was reached by Berenhort who stated that success 
in war could only be ascribed to individual genius. He found 
the formulation of rules futile, if everything one encounters 
forms the exception.19 
During the nineteenth century two traditions developed in the 
thinking about war, one of which stated that war was largely an 
art and the exponent of this approach was Carl von Clausewitz. 
The other one approached war as possessing a degree of skill 
and this proposition can be traced to Antoine Henri, baron de 
Jomini. 
Based on his observations of the Napoleonic wars, but also 
those of Prussian King Frederick the Great at the end of 
the eighteenth century, Clausewitz stated that the nature of 
war is immutable and the character dependent on time and 
context. In other words, the words and the meaning as part of 
the language, are time bound, but the grammar and logic are 
necessary conditions and know important constants. 
Jomini, in the nineteenth century the most important military 
thinker, was of the opinion that warfare was based on rules 
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and immutable principles and with extensive study and 
analysis these could be traced. Jomini was a Swiss banker and 
unlike Clausewitz had never commanded a military force. 
The fact that Jomini was more influential than Clausewitz has 
been attributed to the fact that Jomini substantially out-lived 
Clausewitz. Only with the wars of German unification in 1870 
and the statement of von Moltke the elder, who was largely 
responsible for their success, that his inspiration came from 
Clausewitz, did this situation change in favour of Clausewitz. 
Why is it important to understand the war you are fighting 
and what does it matter if there is a difference between art 
and science? You cannot develop good strategy if you do not 
understand the character of war. According to Clausewitz 
the distinction between art and science was fundamental.20 
Science is aimed at the thorough understanding of a particular 
problem and at increasing human understanding. Art appeals 
to creativity, it has nothing to do with laws but is focused 
on effects on the mind and perception. Yet the distinction is 
not solid because art has certain laws that appeal to the spirit 
based, for example, on the geometry of architecture, or certain 
shapes and colours and their combinations that are simply 
more appealing than others. Conversely, science also appeals 
to a certain extent to creativity and inspiration that cannot 
be clearly categorised as scientific. During the nineteenth and 
twentieth century history the preference for one or the other 
approach swung almost like a pendulum.21 
 
War as the continuation of politics by other means 
The main starting point for thinking about strategy is that 
war is a continuation of politics by other means, according to 
Clausewitz. This is the instrumental or utilitarian perspective 
on war and it appeals to the primacy of politics. Military 
commanders are trained to see themselves as apolitical and 
follow the orders of their political masters. Problems develop 
when politics does not formulate clear directives for the 
military as a guide for action.22 
The emergence of the specific field of strategic studies at the 
start of the Cold War was characterised by an initial emphasis 
on strategy as science. While in the nineteenth century in 
the study of war, the historical case study was central to the 
development of insights, during the early twentieth century 
this approach changed radically. The invention of nuclear 
weapons did - fortunately - not produce much empirical 
evidence, with the exception of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Theory without empirics became the new standard. How 
could war, as a continuation of politics, still apply if there 
was a risk of a war without limits? With the advent of nuclear 
weapons, strategy became a matter of theory and not practical 
experience, creating an opportunity for civilian scientists. It 
was a young civilian researcher who delicately pointed out to a 
General during a debate on strategic planning, “General, I have 
fought just as many nuclear wars as you have”.23 This was the 
beginning of the civilian tradition of thinking about strategy. 
At the birth of the discipline, the idea of applying the scientific 
method to understand the phenomenon of war resurfaced. 
This time the field of economic science in particular, featured 
prominently to think through patterns, to build models and 
apply game theory and mathematics. The idea behind the 
use of economics was that the role of resources to achieve a 
certain end in strategy was similar to cost-benefit calculations 
that are central to economics. What was needed, according to 
the thinkers in this first golden generation of strategic studies, 
which included Brodie but also Herman Kahn and the later 
Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling, was theorization and 
substantiation of thinking about strategy. Schelling noted that 
in fact the armed forces, unlike almost every significant and 
self-respecting professional field had until then no serious 
scientific counterpart.24 
It was Brodie, who in 1949 wrote a manifesto for the scientific 
study of strategy.25 After Hiroshima so goes the story, he told 
his wife that all the work he had done up till then, especially 
in the area of the effects of technology on strategy, could go 
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in the garbage.26 The widespread idea was that the advent of 
nuclear weapons had made all hitherto available knowledge on 
strategy obsolete. What motivated Brodie particularly was the 
fact that the quality of analysis that political decision-makers 
had to work with left lots to be desired.27 The geopolitical 
landscape was clear and an actual military conflict held the 
risk of nuclear escalation. Thinking about strategy went into 
the abstract; Deterrence theory, escalation ladders and second-
strike capabilities. The escalation ladder of Herman Kahn had, 
for example, 44 rungs, the last one being all out nuclear war. 
Whereas in the early years of the Cold War, strategy was 
approached as a science, this changed at the end of the 
nineteen seventies. After the failures of Vietnam and the 
recognition of the shortcomings in thinking about armed 
struggle, there was more attention for war as art. There was 
a Clausewitz revival and a second generation of strategic 
thinkers appeared. They were responsible for the so-called 
‘empirical turn’ with more emphasis on historical research. 
With Hedley Bull ahead of the troops, they argued for the 
study of history as a source of sound strategic thinking. There 
was a recognition of the limitations of the rational actor 
model that assumed that actors are always rational and weigh 
costs and benefits and an appreciation for the role of history 
and culture. Except for the ideas about limited warfare in the 
fifties, as a result of the Korean war, hardly any thought had 
been devoted to conventional war. Strategic thinking at this 
point was recaptured by the military from the civilian thinkers 
through the discovery or development of the operational level 
of war. Here soldiers could get back to the essence of their 
trade, how to wage an armed struggle 
This could not prevent, however, that at the end of the Cold 
War, the field of strategic studies was left practically empty-
handed. The focus during the previous five decades had been 
strongly focused on international conflict, while at the start 
of the nineties, the greatest threat was posed by civil war and 
internal conflicts. The accusations were fundamental, insights 
and theories of civil wars were conspicuously absent. At 
first these civil wars were even placed outside the utilitarian 
Clausewitzean paradigm and described as barbarism.28
 
War as a true chameleon 
The lack of recognition that the essence of these civil wars 
also constituted of violence, a political purpose and a direct 
relationship between these two, cost us dearly. There was no 
appeal to strategic or operational thought. It is inevitable 
that if you are physically present, placed between the warring 
parties, protecting aid convoys and facilitating elections 
that you form a party, if only in the perception of the other 
belligerents. Impartial help to resolve a conflict proved to be a 
myth, it imparts a very normative agenda, based on the idea of  
a compromise peace and democratic elections, which should 
contribute to the establishment of a stable political order. The 
translation into military feasible plans left lots to be desired.29 
There was hardly any strategic thinking even in the more 
conventional wars. While the 1991 Iraq war showed a clear 
political-military interface in the removal of the Iraqi 
occupation forces from Kuwait by defeating the Iraqi armed 
forces with airstrikes and a short war of attrition in Iraq itself. 
The causes of the political problem, the expansionist policies 
of Saddam Hussein, his alleged weapons of mass destruction 
stockpile and his lack of respect for human rights, lead to  a 
new war in 2003. 
Here we see again the tendency, as a result of the partial success 
of 1991, at least in an operational sense, to elevate lessons 
into science. The so-called revolution in military affairs at the 
beginning of the nineties on the basis of technological and 
tactical superiority are yet another expression of the Jominian 
ideas of war. With the use of appropriate technological means, 
automatically the desired effect could be reached.30 Also ideas, 
popular at this time, such as effects-based operations and 
network-centric approaches, still showed echoes of Jomini.31 
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To what extent were we able to think strategically in the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan? In Afghanistan the Taliban 
regime was ousted in 2001 in a very short time by deploying 
special forces and support of local factions. What should 
happen, however, after the Taliban was removed and what 
should the political future of Afghanistan look like, were 
questions that were not subject of fundamental debate. Kabul 
fell in 40 days of fighting, without a genuine strategy.32 In Iraq 
this recipe would be repeated, the regime of Saddam Hussein 
was removed from power in record time and the subsequent 
civil war took the coalition force, as much as the Iraqis 
themselves, by surprise.33 
The Western states were confronted by an insurgent force 
they were not prepared for and the political decision-makers 
failed to develop an appropriate answer. In the absence of an 
all encompassing vision, as others have noted, the operational 
level ended up filling the strategy gap.34 
The rediscovery of classical counter-insurgency theory 
from the era of de-colonisation in the course of 2004 
fits the image of the lower military ranks trying to claim 
strategy in its absence. Martin van Creveld believes that the 
overwhelming majority of the insights that exist in the field 
of counter-insurgency thinking,99% is not worth the paper 
it is written on, because it has been compiled by the losers.35 
Counter-insurgency had been dismissed since the Vietnam 
war and the perception was that it was preferable a type of 
engagement Western armed forces should not get involved 
in. The insights that were available dated mainly from the 
wars of decolonisation and soon the allegedly winning recipe 
of the British, derived from the war in Malaya between 1948 
and 1962 were elevated to standard. The Malayan conflict 
was conducted by the communist party consisting mainly 
of the ethnic Chinese population of Malaya, who demanded 
independence from the British. By listening to the grievances 
of the local population, the ‘hearts and minds’, and the 
granting of independence, the British managed to get the 
upper hand. Only recently have the voices of historians been 
heard that it is not such an ideal typical example as it has been 
made out to be, due to an earlier stage with extremely violent 
forced population relocations.36 The idea was that a combined 
political and military leadership, as in Malaya, and a ‘hearts 
and minds’ policy towards the Iraqi and Afghan people, could 
fill the strategic vacuum, with for the military an emphasis on 
the operational and tactical levels.37 
Together with the concept of the comprehensive approach, 
counter-insurgency is the only idea that could to some extent 
claim the label strategy. It seemed initially that counter-
insurgency would live up to this expectation the moment 
that the commander in Iraq and later Afghanistan, General 
David Petraeus initiated the development of a U.S. counter-
insurgency doctrine that was published in December 2006, 
and which, exceptionally for a military doctrine publication, 
featured for weeks in the New York Times bestseller list.38 
Furthermore, David Kilcullen, an Australian military adviser, 
who was influential in Washington, with his ideas on global 
counterinsurgency centring on curbing the jihadist inspired 
battles which were being fought in several conflict zones, tried 
to elevate counter-insurgency to strategy.39
The question is whether the lessons of another historical 
period were as applicable as presumed. In practice, the 
application became, on the one hand a checklist of rules and 
principles. This has caused some experts to now label counter-
insurgency a tactical tool kit which can be drawn upon 
depending the circumstances.40 On the other hand, counter-
insurgency became an end in itself. Carrying out counter-
insurgency became the logic of operations in Afghanistan. 
The so-called comprehensive approach, also had claims on 
strategic thinking. The comprehensive approach to conflict, 
with the 3Ds of defence, diplomacy and development could 
contribute to conflict transformation from war to peace. 
The underlying analysis was that states plagued by civil 
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war had problems in various fields, a lack of state capacity, 
underdevelopment, socio-economic inequality and a lack of 
respect for human rights.41 The presence of external forces 
could contribute to alleviating all these problems at the same 
time. 
The major shortcoming of the comprehensive approach is that 
it is based on the Western model of state formation and that 
no fundamental choices are made. The democratic state with a 
capitalist market economy is the product of a specific historical 
process that cannot be transplanted one on one to other parts 
of the world. It ignores the fact that in many cases civil wars are 
related to ongoing processes of state formation. Such a process 
is heavily dependent on the formation of a legitimate political 
order based on locally perceived legitimacy. Democracy may 
mean something very distinct in different contexts. The state-
building literature indicates that one of the main mechanisms 
to create a legitimate political order is a monopoly of violence. 
This is exactly what the external intervention forces try to do 
for the local state, robbing the local rulers of all but their one 
main instrument for gaining legitimacy. This is illustrated by 
the difficulties experienced in creating the Afghan national 
army from scratch. 
We can at present not but come to the conclusion that we 
are quite good at tactical disruption of our enemy, instead 
of generating strategic effect. Recent conflicts show that the 
development of a strategic vision for the future of Afghanistan, 
Libya and Mali is missing. We focus particularly on the 
disruption of the enemy through, for example, drone attacks 
in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, Yemen and Somalia, the 
cutting off of irregular groups aiming to occupy urban areas in 
the interior of Mali. A political vision of what should happen 
next continues to be absent. 
A large part of the problem we owe to ourselves. At first it was 
still possible to detect opponents because they had a physical 
home, such as in Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia and Sudan. Our 
actions have had as an unintended effect that they have been 
deprived of their base, and their organisational structure and 
have now become elusive networks, an ideology and an idea 
with lone wolfs carrying out independent action, which is 
even more difficult to detect. Methods have changed, the range 
of actions has shifted as a result of our actions, substitution 
of one tactic for another has occurred. With the pressure on 
organizations and networks, a change of the motives and 
objectives has taken place, the opponent has been forced to opt 
for survival strategies, which has often strengthened internal 
cohesion and generated new frames of enmity. We have failed 
to capitalise on any of these developments. 
Clausewitz has described war as a true chameleon, war can 
significantly alter over time because it is influenced by events 
during the war. Indeed, war is a dynamic and changing 
phenomenon. And above all, it is not linear; there is no direct 
link between the use of resources and the achievement of 
political objectives. More resources do not automatically 
lead to bringing the goals closer. Although the focus of my 
argument so far has been on the use of military means, to 
achieve strategic objectives the use of additional instruments 
is important. Manipulation of the political calculations of 
the opponent can take place in many different ways. The 
continuation of war may in some cases be realistic, even if 
the original objectives have become unattainable. Logical 
drivers, such as prestige, credibility and personal survival may 
become dominant. This way wars persist that could have been 
terminated much earlier.42 
Strategic thinking must thus be flexible enough to adjust to 
the changing dynamics of war over the course of time. At the 
moment it seems that there is a lack of recognition of the 
centre of gravity in the fight against Islamic extremism. This 
may well be the uncommitted population on both sides. An 
effective strategy to play on this centre of gravity would be to 
point out the internal inconsistencies of the opponent.43 Here 
again we fail to capitalise on the fact that the vast majority 
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of victims of violence are Muslim.44 Even though the Taliban 
organisation has a code of conduct which forbids the killing 
of innocent civilians. Is this cluelessness? The policy aimed at 
eliminating the leadership of enemy organizations has as an 
important effect the strengthening of the internal cohesion of 
groups, the hardening of the convictions and increasing the 
recruitment potential because of a clear external enemy. 
Strategic thinking also involves a focus on the internal 
dynamics of the opponent and manipulating the cleavages that 
exist within movements of insurgents. The insight the Sunni 
leaders in Iraq developed that they were better off without the 
support of Al Qaeda in Iraq, responsible for large numbers of 
casualties, the so-called Al Anbar Awakening, which happened 
to coincide with the Surge, the influx of a large number of 
troops, lead to a decline in the rebellion. Manipulating the 
strategic calculations of the opponent may offer better clues 
to attaining objectives rather than the deployment of more or 
better resources. 
War is a true chameleon; There is a dynamic interaction 
between war and policy, which was prominent in the era of 
active warfare in the nineteenth century, and which we have 
lost during the Cold War with policies aimed at preventing 
war.45 
 
Outcomes are rarely final 
The past two decades, wars almost never end in a military 
victory. Increasingly, a negotiated peace or an undecided 
outcome are the ways in which wars terminate. Some of 
you will now think that this is a welcome development. 
Unfortunately, negotiated peace is highly unstable and 
results, in more than fifty percent of the cases, in a renewed 
outbreak of hostilities.46 An undecided outcome, when the 
level of violence simply drops, also has a high probability of 
resumption. Compromise peace in non-democratic political 
systems is often a product of the outside which enjoys little 
internal legitimacy. 
An inadequate and unrealistic vision of a future after the war 
is also related to a lack of strategic thinking. It is clear that a 
military victory is not the same as a political solution but also a 
flawed political outcome can be a source of more conflict. It is 
a precarious balance between generating the results you desire 
and that what is acceptable to your opponents. The higher 
the price you ask of your opponent, the greater the chance 
of a renewed outbreak of hostilities at a later date.47 It often 
happens that opponents switch between strategies, the fight 
after a conventional defeat, for example, can be continued in 
the form of insurgency or terrorism. 
Strategic thinking also means dealing with the realistic 
achievement of objectives and the development of alternative 
political orders in peacetime. Recent research has shown that 
external interventions in civil wars often have an implicit 
preference for the incumbent and against rebel movements 
that challenge state power. However, the latter are statistically 
more likely to achieve a durable peace.48 In addition, the 
chance of a viable democracy is many times larger and 
economic development is in better hands with victorious rebel 
groups. 
The bankruptcy of the neo-liberal paradigm of creating 
democratic states in our own image has already been 
announced, the challenge is to think about alternatives that 
take into account local conditions in states that attempt to 
escape from civil war. The main alternative political system 
to democracy is patrimonialism, a political order that rests 
on a patron-client relationship between different layers of 
the population based on a relationship of reciprocity. How 
can such a system that existed in Europe and came to an 
end-with some exceptions- by the French Revolution, lead 
to development? This is one of the key questions for the 
development of a viable strategy for these states. 
 
I have in my speech tried to show that strategic thinking is 
largely an art rather than a science. We have, at the beginning 
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of the twenty-first century, to recognise that approaching 
war as being subject to laws and predictability has, so far, not 
produced any tenable laws. Michael Handel has not so long ago 
argued that the theory of war is in fact still in a pre-Newtonian, 
pre-formal stage.49 An exception is perhaps the democratic 
peace thesis. Originally developed by Enlightenment thinker 
Immanuel Kant, who argued that democratic states do not 
fight wars against each other, it is to some extent applicable in 
international relations. As the use of the word thesis, however, 
suggests, this leaves on closer inspection a lot to be desired. 
For example, it has no relevance for explaining the dominant 
form of war, civil war. We must be vigilant that the approach to 
strategy as expressed through rules and laws does not hamper 
strategic thinking. Strategic thinking shows you how to think 
and not what to think and this is the essence. 
 
An explanation; Why is strategic thinking so difficult? 
There are a number of factors that complicate strategic 
thinking but which cannot form an excuse to not engage in 
it. First, there is a challenge for politicians and soldiers. The 
short time horizon of electoral cycles in democracies, usually 
four or five years, forms an obstacle to developing a long-term 
vision. In the Netherlands, the terms in office of the past few 
governments was even shorter. Politicians should be aware 
of their responsibility, not only for clearly thinking through 
and articulating potential threats and appropriate policies. 
Also there is a role for the armed forces to properly explain 
the possibilities and impossibilities of deploying the military 
instrument. We should not blame the military too much since 
they have Damocles´ sword hanging over them continuously. If 
they have to say no to the mission, they run the risk of further 
reductions in the defence budget. Demonstrating relevance 
forms an unrelenting pressure. An interesting anecdote is 
the alleged exchange between Madeleine Albright and Colin 
Powell at the time of the intervention issue in Bosnia in the 
nineteen nineties. Powell was very hesitant in the deployment 
of the armed forces for non-essential tasks, and Albright is 
reported to have asked him ; “Why do we have that great 
military you always keep talking about, if we cannot use it?’.50 
Political decision-making would benefit from a good mutual 
understanding of the feasibility of goals and the use of 
appropriate means and a careful balance between the two. 
Secondly, strategic thinking takes place primarily in the context 
of alliances and coalitions, as the most likely format for foreign 
intervention. The ambition of being a reliable coalition partner 
- ‘to keep the Americans in’- must not and cannot absolve 
us from developing viable plans for conflict zones far away 
from home. John Mackinlay has suggested that the planning 
process within NATO as a result of the Cold War has ‘become 
a ritual of Byzantine complexity’.51 This, however, should not 
serve as an impediment for developing strategy. It is true that 
states plagued by civil war are responsible for their own future. 
However, if we further wish to assist these states, we must have 
a clear, achievable and scientifically sound understanding of 
how we want to engage. Strategic thinking is again essential.
Thirdly, there is a challenge in the field of education and 
science. Abstract theory without a link to reality does not 
make translating ideas into practice easier.52 What is held to be 
true or essential scientifically might not always be politically 
feasible or appropriate. The  field has always had to navigate 
between the “Scylla of political expediency and the Charybdis 
of academic relevance and credibility”.53 The first years of 
the nuclear debate have shown us that much theorising was 
not feasible nor realistic when confronted with practice.54 
However, there is hope, the field of strategic studies has a long 
tradition of painful experiences and shortcomings that form 
an incentive for new ideas and debate.55 
Solutions? To encourage more strategic thinking we need 
proper training and an appreciation for strategic thinking as 
a career option. One of the main causes of a lack of strategic 
thinking is an underestimation of the fundamental nature of 
strategic thinking as an enterprise.56 We must avoid at all cost 
falling into the trap of cluelessness. Without clear strategic 
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theory we run the risk of operational planning outflanking 
strategy.57 The development of a career perspective with a 
specific focus on strategy as a core competency in the Foreign 
Office and the armed forces would be my main practical 
recommendation.58 
To finish the story of Elizabeth Bennet from Pride and 
Prejudice, with whom I started my speech, of course she gets 
her Mr. Darcy, unlike Austen who never married, but who has 
now not only been posthumously credited as the author of 
game theory that played such a huge role during the golden age 
of strategic thinking, even before the original author John von 
Neumann with his 1944 publication of the Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior. She has also been hailed in fact as the 
one and only strategic thinker of the eighteenth century, for 
the critical listener, before the invention of strategic thought 
as a product of the Napoleonic wars.59 It was another great 
English author who claimed that ‘all’s fair in love and war’ 
indicating an even greater similarity between romance and 
military strategy than Jane Austen could have ever intended 
or imagined. The underlying message, however, might be, to 
beware of ladies with a pen writing about love … and strategy. 
A word of thanks
First of all, I am indebted to the board of the foundation for 
Strategic Studies for the confidence it has bestowed on me.
My great teacher and mentor Jan Geert Siccama should have 
been here today. Unfortunately, we were forced to bid our 
final farewells at far too early an age, exactly one year ago this 
month. Yet he is here today, I have the great privilege to wear 
his gown. Thank you, dear Wilma.
I stand here alone, however, I do tend to think about practicing 
science as an activity that you just cannot do on your own. I 
would like to thank my colleagues and friends who continually 
challenge me and keep me on my toes. The fact that I will serve 
the field of strategic studies in this present capacity is also a 
recognition for all of you that you are important and make a 
difference!
I would also like to thank my students. I have the privilege to 
guide you and teach you in this important and formative phase 
in your lives and it is a great pleasure to see a new generation 
develop. And as I argued earlier, there is great need for new and 
fresh strategic thinkers.
Je veux aussi bien remercier ma meilleure amie Claire, qui est 
avec nous aujourd’hui; pour plus de vent ans d’ amitié. Merci 
chère Claire.
My parents and my sister for their help and support in good 
times and in challenging times, without them this could not 
have been realised. Thank you.
My story this afternoon talked about a few villains and many 
heroes, my own heroes are Antoinette, Etienne, Benedict 
and Sebastian. I am indebted to them for many things but in 
particular for keeping me in balance and for showing me at 
times that, even though it is nice to show off to your friends 
that mom has written a book with a soldier on the front cover, 
writing books is not the most important thing in life. And 
finally my own romantic hero, Mark, thanks for everything, 
everything in particular.
I have said.
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Isabelle Duyvesteyn
Duyvesteyn argues in her inaugural speech that in the past 
two decades we have largely forgotten the art of how to think 
strategically. Strategic thinking importantly involves linking 
means and ends in foreign policy. The field of strategic studies 
has a long tradition of applying scientific methods to uncover 
rules and principles of warfare. Since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, scholars have tried, based on careful study, 
to dissect the essence of war. Till today no generally valid 
laws have emerged. The urge to think about war as subject 
to rules and principles, Duyvesteyn argues, has acted as an 
important impediment to sound strategic thinking. Strategic 
thinking ultimately does not dictate what you should think 
when waging war but it rather offers a framework on how to 
think about war. Strategic thinking is difficult because it is 
based on a long-term vision that is arduous to realise in short 
electoral cycles, and in the complex context of alliance and 
coalition decision-making. Yet strategic thinking is essential 
to realise foreign policy objectives. What, for example, do we 
do with states that are plagued by armed conflict and how can 
we contribute to their stabilisation? These are key questions 
that need an answer before a new and necessary strategic 
vision can be developed. The solution Duyvesteyn proposes, 
to achieve greater strategic thinking, is to formally recognise a 
core competency of strategic planning as a career path in the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. There is also a role 
for education and research to contribute to a necessary debate 
on strategic thinking and the essence of strategy.
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